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Borders as Places of Control. Fixing, Shifting  
and Reinventing State Borders. An Introduction 
Fabian Gülzau, Steffen Mau & Kristina Korte 
Abstract: »Grenzen als Kontrollorte. Staatsgrenzen fixieren, verschieben und 
neu erfinden«. The globalizing forces of trade, capital movement, the circula-
tion of information, and human mobility have challenged conventional un-
derstandings of borders as entry gates that are under the firm control of na-
tion states. Some scholars have even assumed that nation states would 
eventually lose control of their borders due to new challenges. However, bor-
ders have proved to be resilient institutions as states have adapted and rein-
vented border controls in several ways. First, states have responded to new 
challenges by hardening their territorial boundaries through border fortifica-
tions. Second, governments have shifted border control to third countries by 
using tools such as visa policies or readmission agreements. Third, nation 
states have designed “smart borders” through biometric passports, shared 
databases, and digital surveillance technologies. Lastly, de-facto borders 
show that clearly delimited boundaries can be attractive to countries, even in 
regions with limited statehood.  
Keywords: Borders, shifting border, border walls, smart border, de-facto bor-
ders, globalization.  
1. Globalization and “Vanishing Borders” 
In summer 1987, the U.S. president, Ronald Reagan, visited West Berlin and 
gave a speech in front of the Brandenburg Gate, addressing the leader of the 
Soviet Union: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!” Two years later, as a 
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result of the peaceful uprising of people in the former GDR, the Berlin Wall, 
a monument of division and block confrontation, came to the end of its exist-
ence. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a widespread illusion that 
hard borders could become more porous and ultimately lose their signifi-
cance. At the same time, the trend of globalization was unfolding, with an 
unprecedented increase in cross-border mobility and transactions.  
During the 1990s, there was an intense and overly optimistic debate on the 
dismantling of hard or closed borders due to the forces of globalization. 
Catchphrases such as “vanishing borders” (French 2000) or “borderless 
world” (Ohmae 1990) alluded to an imagery where goods, money, ideas, and 
people could cross borders with growing ease and where the capacity of na-
tion states to close borders or to install rigid measures of control or contain-
ment was diminishing. Not surprisingly, globalization was – at its very core – 
understood as transcending national borders and producing heightened in-
terconnectedness across borders.  
In fact, most globalization indicators point to a continuing trend of in-
creased transnational interconnectedness and cross-border flows (Gygli et al. 
2019). Today, the world is not only spanned by a dense network of cross-bor-
der trade and communication technology but also by transnational human 
mobility (Deutschmann 2016). For instance, the number of tourist journeys 
tripled between 1990 and 2018, when 1.4 billion arrivals were recorded (Roser 
2017). However, international borders are also crossed by a growing number 
of refugees displaced by violent conflicts, famines, persecution, and other 
events. In 2019, roughly 1 percent of the global population was forcibly dis-
placed, while the number of refugees approximately doubled, from 10 to 20.4 
million between 2010 and 2019 (UNHCR 2020). Although the majority of dis-
placed persons stay in the close proximity of their country of origin, migra-
tion has become a decisive issue on the domestic and international political 
agenda (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2020).1  
Given the growth in cross-border movements, it is questionable whether 
one can still conceive territoriality in terms of closure and containment. One 
of the strong criticisms raised in this context is that considering the state as a 
fixed unit of territorial space, which neatly separates the inside from the out-
side, is a conceptual trap – or, more precisely, a “territorial trap” (Agnew 
1994). We may have never actually lived in a “container society,” but under 
conditions of globalization this assumption becomes even less tenable. An 
offshoot of this debate was a reframing and a different understanding of the 
role of the state as gatekeeper and border guard. The loss-of-control thesis 
suggests that the traditional attributes of state sovereignty and national terri-
tory are coming under pressure in the wake of globalization, transnationali-
zation, and internationalization. In addition, the forces of global markets and 
 
1  Countries that host a large numbers of refugees include Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran, and 
Ethiopia (de Haas, Castles, and Miller 2020, 7).  
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the rise of international codes and institutions contribute to a reshuffling of 
sovereignty and territoriality as fundamental principles of statehood (Sassen 
1996). Moreover, technological developments and innovation have ultimately 
facilitated the view that connectedness is one of the signs of our era, leading 
to statements such as “the world is flat” (Friedman 2006).  
2. Waning Sovereignty? 
With an eye on borders and border control, a similar story could be told. It 
has been claimed that governments have an increasing inability to curtail mi-
gration and mobility, and that the flow of people cannot be effectively con-
trolled. In other words, “borders are beyond control” (Bhagwati 2003). Even 
when states seek to restrict and constrain migration, they often fail (Castles 
2004). Migratory processes have their own momentum and are linked to eco-
nomic globalization and global inequalities, so that regardless of the aim of 
states, policies often miss their political objectives. The growing skepticism 
about the effectiveness of border enforcement is rooted in the multiplication 
of transnational actors – migrants, corporations, and international organiza-
tions – that challenge state borders (Brunet-Jailly 2011; Andreas 2003).  
A case in point is the so-called “summer of migration” of 2015, when Syrian 
refugees established a route from the Greek mainland along the Balkans to-
ward Western Europe. After becoming stranded in Hungary, the refugees “re-
appropriated their own mobility to collectively and defiantly leave Budapest” 
(Kasparek 2016, 5). Despite subsequent efforts to restrict “secondary move-
ments,” Schengen member states still struggle to implement a “future-proof” 
migration governance (Geddes 2018). In this perspective, the walls, fences, 
and barriers erected by states such as Greece, Hungary, or the USA have been 
understood as symbols of eroding state power. Although border fortifications 
are imposing structures, some claim that they might signify waning sover-
eignty rather than strength (Brown 2017).  
In addition, more immediate threats to international borders have occurred 
through territorial conflict, state instability, and illicit markets. In recent 
years, several world regions have been affected by persistent internal con-
flicts that have proved difficult to resolve. In Syria and eastern Ukraine, non-
state actors took control of disputed territories and established de-facto bor-
ders. In addition, the territorial integrity norm (Zacher 2001), which prohibits 
territorial conquest, has become fragile (Altman 2017). In the wake of a polit-
ical crisis in Ukraine, the Crimean Peninsula was annexed by Russia in 2014. 
Similar developments can be observed in Syria, where Turkish forces control 
foreign territories, thus bringing into question the territorial sovereignty of a 
neighboring state.  
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In addition to overt territorial disputes, clandestine actors also challenge 
international borders by subverting border controls through illicit trade 
routes (Simmons 2019, 262). Although by nature difficult to assess, the trade 
of illicit goods is likely to have benefitted from globalization and digitization. 
For instance, the trade in counterfeit and pirated goods grew between 2013 
and 2016, despite an economic slump (OECD/EUIPO 2019). A related issue re-
lates to human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants. In Europe, the 
smuggling of refugees across the Mediterranean Sea involves life-threatening 
journeys with high mortality rates (Steinhilper and Gruijters 2018).  
The complexity of cross-border flows and conflicts has challenged tradi-
tional understandings of borders and border controls. In response, states 
have continuously expanded their toolkit of border control measures. In this 
process, governments reconfigure borders by shifting, fixing, and reinvent-
ing border controls. In the following, we address some of the recent trends in 
border control.  
3. Borders that Stay, Emerge, Move, and Transform 
Today, more than two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we know that 
borders have neither disappeared nor lost their significance. Instead, we see 
that they have been reinforced, shifted, and reinvented (Mau 2021). Certainly, 
in some parts of the world – for example the Schengen area – borders have 
been dismantled and internal border controls have been removed, but in 
other places, borders have become even stronger infrastructures of separa-
tion and control. On the one hand, new fortifications are emerging all around 
the world at an accelerating pace (Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Vallet 2021). 
On the other hand, border control has also shifted away from the border line, 
extending control to the exterior as well as to the interior (Shachar 2007, 2020; 
Zaiotti 2016; FitzGerald 2020). Part of the externalization of control is the is-
suance of visas that takes places far from the border in consulates or embas-
sies. This is a well-established practice but has become more selective over 
time (Recchi et al. 2021; Mau et al. 2015). Further, the involvement of third 
countries and transit countries in aspirations for control constitutes a signif-
icant trend, as does the increasing role of carrier sanctions (Laube 2013). 
Lastly, states have developed “smart borders,” which combine surveillance 
technologies and biometric data to monitor and regulate cross-border flows 
(Amoore 2006).  
As places of border control are multiplying, some researchers have sug-
gested moving the focus away from borders as locations and treating border-
ing more as a social process (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). From 
this perspective, control is not only multiplying in space – as it can take place 
at various locations such as airports, control posts, or in the streets – but is 
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also multiplying in time, as people are subjected to acts of everyday bordering 
at any time in daily life (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019). While the 
traditional notion of border control refers to the demarcation and delimita-
tion of territories, bordering as a process is linked to sorting, othering, and 
categorization, which are in turn linked to the mobility opportunities of peo-
ple (Newman 2006). As a consequence, borders and border practices are con-
sidered as becoming more complex, ambivalent, and paradoxical (Laine 
2021; Brown 2017; Balibar 2017; Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). 
4. Borders as Places of Control 
Our special issue seeks to trace the transformation of international borders 
and border control. This involves a functional perspective on borders – one 
that allows us to move away from considering the border line at the edge of a 
state’s territory (Salter 2004, 80). Though borders still relate to a territory and 
erect dividing lines between states, they are much more than that: they are 
apparatuses, types of interventions, and infrastructures that are not neces-
sarily territorially fixed. As a response to the upheavals of globalization, states 
started to detach the bordering function from the actual border line (Shachar 
2020). However, the global diffusion of border walls and fences demonstrates 
that the fixed territorial border is not disappearing but is multiplying, as 
“other border locations are being added” (Mau 2020, 143).  
In our perspective, borders are specific modes of control that combine a 
physical infrastructure, personnel, policies, and digital technology with the 
aim of regulating mobility and cross-border transactions. Accordingly, we fo-
cus on the border as a form of control. We do not, however, put all issues 
surrounding borders and bordering at center stage, but instead focus on the 
way border control is organized and exercised.  
Table 1 highlights the trends and developments in borders and border con-
trols. In particular, we investigate the following trends: First, the fortification 
of border lines through border walls and fences. Second, the externalization 
of migration control and management. Third, the increasing use of “smart 
borders” to gather biometric data for mobile persons. Lastly, the occurrence 
of de-facto borders in areas of limited statehood. In the following, we de-
scribe adjustments that states have made to reconfigure their borders. In ad-
dition, the respective contributions to this special issue are introduced.  
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Table 1 Trends in Borders and Border Control 




Growing use of physical ob-
stacles (e.g., walls or fences) 
at border lines 
- Gülzau & Mau (Ch. 1) 
- Korte (Ch. 2) 
Externalization of control 
 
 
Border controls beyond a 
country’s territory (e.g., visa 
policies and joint migration 
management) 
- Laube (Ch. 3) 




Digital surveillance of mobil-
ity through (biometric) data 
- Shachar & Mahmood (Ch. 5) 





Border controls in in areas of 
limited statehood and at 
ceasefire lines 
- Kolosov & Zotova (Ch. 7) 
- Sasse & von Löwis (Ch. 8) 
4.1 Border Walls 
Border walls have forcefully returned to the global scenery (Vallet and David 
2012). They are imposing infrastructures of demarcation and separation as 
well as signs of symbolic power. In general, states erect border fortifications 
by “installing impassable obstacles through the use of cumbersome seem-
ingly inert materials of stone, earth, concrete, and metal” (Denman 2019, 
232). As border control sites have multiplied, such border fortifications are 
often “the last point of encounter” (Shachar 2020, 5) with the bordering func-
tion. Yet the growing fascination with border barriers shows that fixed bor-
ders are far from becoming obsolete. On the contrary, it is known that the 
construction of border barriers has accelerated since the 1990s (Hassner and 
Wittenberg 2015; Vallet 2021). In fact, around half of all the border barriers 
that have been built since the 1950s were erected between 2000 and 2014 
(Hassner and Wittenberg 2015).  
The reasons behind the trend toward hardened borders are, however, still 
being debated (Simmons 2019). Scholars argue that fortified borders resem-
ble military installations in their appearance, but instead of being directed 
against opposing armies, they reinforce “discontinuity lines” between afflu-
ent and poor societies (Rosière and Jones 2012). Research also explains the 
surge in wall building as being due to increased security concerns in times of 
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global terrorism (Avdan 2019). Nevertheless, states most often refer to un-
wanted migration in order to justify their border fortifications (Vallet 2021). 
Examples of this include the border barriers in Greece, Hungary, and North 
Macedonia that were rapidly built during the “flurry of wall building” (Brown 
2017, 16) following Europe’s migration and refugee crisis of 2015–16. Lastly, 
research indicates that border barriers might be more common in specific 
regions such as Asia (Jones 2018).  
With regard to the effectiveness of border fortifications, research broadly 
agrees that heavy border fortifications are costly and inefficient measures 
(Gulasekaram 2012; Vallet 2017). A case in point is the expansion of the U.S. 
border fence between 2007 and 2010 that is estimated to have involved costs 
of roughly $7 per person living in the USA (Allen, Dobbin, and Morten 2018). 
In addition, border barriers have a negative effect on cross-border trade 
(Carter and Poast 2020). Less is known about the effect of border barriers on 
other cross-border flows. However, a study of the Israeli barriers reports that 
smuggling has decreased in protected areas but has also been diverted and 
increased in not-yet-protected towns (Getmansky, Grossman, and Wright 
2019). Recent studies also report that border fences may lower transnational 
terrorism and insurgencies (Avdan and Gelpi 2016; Staniland 2005). Lastly, 
the effect of border walls on the local populations has not yet been suffi-
ciently explored.  
Two contributions in this special issue investigate border fortifications. Fa-
bian Gülzau and Steffen Mau introduce a new dataset, the Border Infrastruc-
ture Data, which measures how states design their territorial border lines 
through the physical border infrastructure. Their typology distinguishes –  
from relatively open to completely closed – “no-man’s-land” borders, land-
mark borders, checkpoint borders, barrier borders, and fortified borders. 
While barrier and fortified types account for a fifth of all global borders, par-
ticularly in Asia and Europe, checkpoint borders remain the most prevalent 
design across continents. Further, fortified borders are predominantly used 
by affluent states when there is a significant wealth gap with neighboring 
countries. The contribution enriches the debate on border infrastructures by 
considering different ways in which states design their international borders.  
In her contribution, Kristina Korte explores the effect of border fortifica-
tions on mobility. Using in-depth qualitative material from four case studies 
in Algeria and Morocco, Hungary and Serbia, India and Pakistan, and the USA 
and Mexico, she shows that fortified borders either operate as filter or dead-
lock borders. Filter borders reinforce the global gap in mobility rights by 
blocking migrants, whereas deadlock borders also lead to increasing inequal-
ity within a country (between the capital and the border population) by cut-
ting economic, social, and familial ties across the border line. Filter and dead-
lock borders also differ with regard to power relations between neighboring 
states. While filter borders are characterized by clear gaps in power and 
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wealth, the relations across deadlock borders are ambiguous and more con-
tested.  
4.2 Shifting Borders and Externalization of Control 
Under the conditions of globalization, border functions and border lines are 
increasingly becoming decoupled. As a result, Shachar (2020, 7) argues that 
research on territorial borders needs to be complemented by studies that in-
vestigate “the movement of borders to regulate the mobility of people.” This 
change in perspective is only logical when thinking of borders from the view-
point of mobile persons. For them, borders are interventions in mobility: the 
authorization and enabling or the hindering of mobility that influence the 
movement of people through territories. Points of embarkation, transit 
points, international airports – all have become sites of control (Yuval-Davis, 
Wemyss, and Cassidy 2019; Laube 2013).  
The shifting border involves, first and foremost, the “remote control” 
(Zolberg 2006) of mobile populations. In particular, states are pushing the 
border outward by requiring travelers to apply for a visa before embarking 
on a journey. Together with carrier sanctions, visa fees, and consular ap-
pointments, they create a considerable barrier against unwanted mobility 
(Collinson 1996; Czaika, de Haas, and Villares-Varela 2018). At the same time, 
states selectively implement visa waiver agreements to lift the requirements 
for anyone with a “trustworthy” passport. The unequal distribution of visa-
free travel opportunities creates a “global mobility divide” (Mau et al. 2015).  
Agreements with third countries are part and parcel of the externalization 
of control. In this regard, the Danish government recently passed a bill that 
enables the relocation of refugees to third countries in order to assess their 
asylum claims abroad (The Guardian 2021). Although international organiza-
tions such as the African Union (AU) subsequently condemned the Danish 
proposal, the “offshoring” of asylum procedures is only the latest step in a 
longer chain of developments concerning the involvement of third countries 
in migration governance (African Union 2021).2 For instance, the European 
Union (EU) has implemented multiple readmission agreements with transit 
countries. Together with the “safe third country” rule, such agreements sup-
port the deportation of unwanted migrants (Laube and Müller 2015). At the 
same time, states are also shifting the border line inward by creating internal 
zones with limited constitutional rights. Cases in point are the “constitution 
free” zone in the USA, the “excision” zone in Australia, and transit zones in 
European airports. In these spaces, undocumented migrants and asylum 
seekers are subject to special procedures, such as expedited removal (Sha-
char 2020).  
 
2  Australia is the only country that currently relocates refugees to third-countries – Nauru and 
Papua New Guinea – in order to process their asylum claims (Shachar 2020, 46-7).  
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In this special issue, Lena Laube shows that the involvement of transit states 
in migration governance has opened up new space for “migration diplo-
macy.” She explores how the EU’s externalization of border control has af-
fected the power balance between destination and transit countries. In par-
ticular, transit countries such as Turkey, Morocco, and Moldova have 
increased their bargaining power by becoming involved in EU migration gov-
ernance. A case in point is the EU-Turkey-Statement of 2016, which illustrates 
that transit states can negotiate considerable concessions in return for assum-
ing border control tasks. The agreement also highlights that EU member 
states can be exposed to political blackmail when externalizing their border 
control.  
The contribution by Ruben Zaiotti and Nafisa Abdulhamid investigates how 
EU member states have reconfigured exterritorial border controls during the 
ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The authors argue that core components of Eu-
rope’s externalized border management, such as visa policies, have been ad-
justed and re-imported inside the EU’s territory – a development that they 
term the “internalization of externalized border controls.” The chapter con-
cludes that the re-purposing of externalized border controls has limited the 
mobility rights of both EU and non-EU citizens.  
4.3 “Smartification” of Control 
Driven by technological innovation and the availability of new tools for the 
identification and monitoring of people, there has been a significant shift in 
the form of border control. On the one hand, technology allows for the detec-
tion (and deterrence) of border crossings without border guards being pre-
sent at the location (border surveillance systems, drones, acoustic devices, 
light detection, etc.); on the other hand, new technology-based entry/exit sys-
tems, automated border control (e-gates), and biometrics to identify people 
are now being used for screening and selectivity purposes (Amoore 2006; 
Elden 2013).  
The development of smart borders under conditions of globalization is a 
significant step, as this allows states to not only facilitate and block mobility 
at the same time, but also to target their control measures at “unwanted” peo-
ple classified as “risky travelers.” Since the attacks of 9/11, the development 
of digital technologies has accelerated due to the growing salience of global 
terrorism (Ackleson 2003; Amoore 2006). Today, governments routinely 
gather biometric data through fingerprints and facial recognition in order to 
monitor cross-border travel (Sontowski 2018; Vukov and Sheller 2013). Sys-
tems such as the European Travel Information and Authorization System 
(ETIAS) that require people to provide information before traveling to a des-
tination country are used by multiple states (e.g., ETA in Australia, eTA in 
Canada, and ESTA in the U.S.; Vavoula 2017). Further, data is also exchanged 
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between states to check entries against other databases (Amelung and Ma-
chado 2019).  
Crises are often a driving force behind changes to the “bordering function” 
of states. The U.S. Smart Border Declaration was launched as a response to 
the 9/11 attacks (Salter 2004). Similarly, the European migration and refugee 
crisis of 2015–16 motivated several European countries to erect border 
fences, but also to use digital technologies for border control. In this special 
issue, Ayelet Shachar and Aaqib Mahmood investigate recent changes to the 
global mobility regime that have been made following the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The authors show how the shifting border has become the new norm 
for the management of mobility. Mobility is tightly monitored through testing 
requirements, vaccination passports, and the digital surveillance of quaran-
tine regulations. As a result, the control function of the territorial border is 
shifted onto mobile bodies. The authors argue that it may be difficult to roll-
back to a pre-crisis travel regime, as “bio-surveillance […] provides govern-
ments unprecedented technological ‘see-all’ eyes to monitor and track every-
one’s mobility everywhere” (Shachar and Mahmood 2021, 147, in this special 
issue).  
The contribution by Nina Amelung investigates the case of the Eurodac sys-
tem, which is used by EU member states to collect and share fingerprints 
from asylum seekers and irregular immigrants. In particular, the work stud-
ies the Eurodac database through the lens of “crimmigration”; that is, the con-
vergence of crime control and immigration management. The chapter shows 
that the scope of Eurodac has been continuously expanded by making it in-
teroperable with policing databases. In this process, asylum seekers are rou-
tinely exposed to suspicion when their fingerprints are accessed by law en-
forcement. As a result, asylum seekers are considered as potential 
lawbreakers without the option “to ‘opt out’ or exert control over their data” 
(Amelung 2021, 17, in this special issue).  
4.4 Contested Border Control 
The final section looks at instances where the state’s ability to maintain bor-
der functions is undermined or weakened. In such cases, “loss of control” 
may become a significant feature of the border. In areas of limited statehood, 
such as in the Donbas region, Abkhazia and Ossetia, Syria, and Libya, state 
borders are not always under the control of a central government. However, 
separationists and armed groups have an interest in claiming legitimacy 
through state-building and border delineation (Bakke et al. 2018). Accord-
ingly, when conflicts freeze, ceasefire lines emerge and de-facto borders are 
established (Dembinska and Campana 2017). In such circumstances, we can 
identify functional equivalents to a state’s bordering functions.  
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Two contributions in this issue investigate the dynamics of de-facto bor-
ders. Vladimir Kolosov and Maria Zotova compare six non-recognized states in 
the post-Soviet space. They study cross-border relations between de-facto 
states, parent states, and patron states. Although these relations vary, the au-
thors find that the borders between de-facto and patron states are often con-
tact points with frequent cross-border mobility. By contrast, the borders be-
tween de-facto and parent states that do not coincide with former boundary 
lines are regularly places of hostility and blockades. The analysis highlights 
that the COVID-19 pandemic has magnified the barrier function of de-facto 
borders.  
The contribution by Gwendolyn Sasse and Sabine von Löwis scrutinizes the 
cross-border dynamics at the ceasefire line between Ukraine and the non-
government-controlled areas in the Donbas region. The work uses novel eth-
nographic and survey data to shed light on evolving border practices across 
the contact line. The survey data, which was collected in 2016 and 2019, pro-
vides insights into the attitudes and practices of the borderland population. 
The chapter shows that the ceasefire line has disrupted social ties, but that it 
also guarantees a minimum of security and enables cross-border exchange. 
5. Conclusion 
This introduction started with the observation that borders and border con-
trols are challenged by globalizing forces. In light of the transnational flows 
of goods, people, and information, territorial border controls were expected 
to lose significance and become less feasible. Although the far-reaching loss-
of-control thesis has ultimately been rejected, it is clear that states have 
needed to adapt their border controls to new realities. Accordingly, we trace 
how states have adjusted their border regimes by fixing, shifting, and rein-
venting border controls. In particular, we identify four developments in bor-
der control. First, states buffer their fixed territorial boundaries by installing 
border walls and fences. Second, the border function is detached from the 
actual border line by externalizing controls. Third, “smart borders” are in-
stalled to gather biometric data on mobile persons. Such data is increasingly 
stored and exchanged between states and agencies, and it also plays a crucial 
role in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic. Lastly, de-facto borders are 
included in order to investigate border dynamics in areas of limited statehood 
and at ceasefire lines.  
The special issue investigates trends and developments in borders and bor-
der controls. Given the new complexity of borders, it is clear that the notion 
of borders as territorially fixed has become less tenable. Accordingly, we pro-
posed studying border functions instead of predefined border locations. This 
perspective reveals how states are digitizing, reinforcing, and externalizing 
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border controls in response to new challenges. It can only be surmised that 
the developments highlighted will be exacerbated by the global pandemic.  
The individual contributions demonstrate that borders are constantly rein-
vented and are readjusted to changing circumstances. Borders are by no 
means obsolete, but are forceful “sorting engines” in a globalized world (Mau 
2021). Shifting borders and the excessive use of digital technology are signif-
icant developments and are part and parcel of new forms of border control. 
However, even “ancient” technologies such as border fortifications resurface 
as high-technology fences. Most recently, we see that border strategies that 
had been devised to externalize migration controls are being repurposed to 
limit movement in times of a global pandemic. Relatedly, passports have 
been expanded to include the vaccination status.  
In summary, the contributions provide an overview of current develop-
ments regarding state borders and border control. Future research should 
build on the findings to examine the extent to which the individual develop-
ments interact. For example, border crossings at fortified borders are ideal 
places for capturing and matching biometric data. The same is true for any 
checkpoint along a journey, whether at a consulate or an airport. The tension 
between economic globalization and personal mobility will ensure that states 
are forced to constantly adapt and reinvent their borders.  
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